Introduction
Among the main paradoxes that influenced the foundations of mathematics, let us mention Russel's Paradox (The Principles of Mathematics, 1903) which showed the necessity of an axiomatic approach to set theory, and the most ancient, so called Liar Paradox ("This sentence is false"), which has led to the famous Godel's incompleteness theorems. Concerning Physics, there is, however, a paradox -we call it the Memory Paradox -that, curiously, has remained unknown, despite its simplicity and deep consequences. It is the fact that memory cannot completely predict its own future state. The idea is simple. If the memory m(t) at time t knows its future state m(t ′ ), at time t ′ > t, then m(t ′ ) must be contained in some way in m(t). But since the future memory always contains previous ones (it is the main property of memory), m(t) is contained in m(t ′ ) which is contained in m(t); we have thus a circularity or vicious circle, typical of paradoxes. That this Memory Paradox leads to a contradiction is shown in the next sections.
Definitions
By a deductive theory, we mean a theory that is based on (not necessarily completely formal) logical reasoning, as e.g. mathematics, logic itself of course, or more casually physical science, theoretical or applied. If F is the theory and ⊢ the symbol of deduction, F ⊢ A means that A is deducible from (or can be proved in) the theory F .
By a deterministic theory, we mean a deductive theory in which a time variable t is defined, t belonging as usual to an interval of real numbers (however an ordered set is sufficient here), and any true event E(t) expressible in the theory and occurring at time t can be deduced 'in advance' in the theory, i.e., there exists a t ′ < t such that
where in F appear only events that occurred at time ≤ t ′ (this can be formulated precisely in logical terms, but this is not necessary here). In such case the event E(t) is said to be predicted or (pre)determined at time t ′ by theory F .
By an observing machine M with memory based on a deductive theory F we mean a machine (e.g., a Turing machine) a computer or a human brain that can observe (or read) any finitely coded sentence or formula (expressible in F ) that appears on a tape or in the coded observational field of the machine; moreover, the machine stores this sentence or a part of it in its memory, i.e., the finite set of already stored sentences since a given time (the machine, of course, can observe only a finite number of times). In particular, the machine M can observe the second member of formula (1) above relative to the event E(t) as soon as the formula has appeared among (or in the list of) deducible formulas in F , i.e., at time t ′ < t , and stores the predicted event E(t) in its memory.
Let us write M(t, x(t), m(t)) for "at time t M observes x(t) and stores it in its memory m(t)". By the definition above, the memory obviously has the following property:
This corresponds to the very meaning of the notion of memory.
Main Results
Theorem. The existence of an observing machine with memory based on a deductive theory F is inconsistent with the theory F being deterministic.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Since the theory F is deterministic, in particular in what concerns M, at some time t ′ < t the behavior of the machine M at time t is predetermined in the theory, i.e.,
x(t), m(t))
. Then already at time t ′ , the machine M observes the predicted event and stores it in its memory m(t ′ ), thus
Now, when later on, time t indeed occurs, if the deterministic prediction is correct, the expected event M(t, x(t), m(t)) should occur as well, but since t ′ < t , because of (2) we have m(t ′ ) ⊂ m(t), and therefore, M(t, x(t), m(t)) ∈ m(t), which is impossible since m(t) is finitely coded.
Commentary. What we need is that the interval of time between t ′ and t be large enough for M to have observed and stored (possibly at time t ′′ with t ′ < t ′′ ≤ t) the predicted sentence M(t, x(t), m(t)) before (or at the latest at) time t. Technically for such simple a task, a machine nowadays needs a very small fraction of time, while a deterministic theory, if all needed information is available, should calculate and predict an event, in principle, "sufficiently" in advance. Otherwise, if there is no time to know a predicted result before it happens, there is of course no prediction and the determinism would have no more value than the religious belief that "everything is already written" in some Book for ever unknown. In any case, if we accept determinism in the ordinary meaning of the word so that the predicted event can be recorded as such, the theorem shows that it is not compatible with observation and memory. Corollary 1. In the deterministic part of classical physics, an observing machine with memory cannot be defined (and therefore constructed). Now, since an observing machine with memory certainly exists in our physical world, e.g., as the brain of human being or, more elementarily, as a modern computer, we have Corollary 2. Physics as a whole cannot be completely deterministic. Now, if we restrict the reasoning to classical physics, the same conclusion appears if we assume the classical determinism. Indeed, because of the paradox, a deterministic classical Machine cannot predict its own future memory, refuting the famous idea of Pierre-Simon Laplace of a 'Demon' who, knowing all the data of the universe at time t, could predict any future event (at time t ′ > t) [3] . The Demon could predict any event except its own future memory. Even if we suppose that all functions are continuous, the prediction is not possible. The problem is that the initial data needed for the calculus (to be made by the Machine to predict its future) are not well defined; indeed, these data should already integrate the fact that the Machine is going to perform the calculus on these data, so that the definition of the set of data contains a circularity. Of course, the Machine can calculate and predict events in which the Machine is not involved.
Corollary 3. Classical physics are not deterministic.
This result is different from the results starting from Hadamard [2] and Poincaré [4] which concern deterministic but not (practically) predictive dynamic situations related to what is now called chaos. Corollary 3 refutes the theoretical determinism of classical Physics while Chaos Theories do not. The question appears whether this non determinism is meaningful only on the macroscopic level because of the concept of a machine, or whether it is true also at the quantum level.
